Moral Evidentialism and Wide-Scope Requirements
Abstract: In my talk, I defend Moral Evidentialism – the view that it is morally wrong to form and maintain beliefs upon insufficient evidence. Berit Brogaard (2014) argues that believing on insufficient evidence cannot be considered as a moral wrongdoing, for the reason that, belief, by itself, is not a proper object of moral appraisals. Alternatively, she claims that beliefs are subject to wide-scope conditional moral requirements that can be satisfied without being epistemically rational. I show that Brogaard’s argument fails to pose a problem for Moral Evidentialism.
Does Conciliationism Carry a Problematic Commitment to Uniqueness?
Abstract: I defend Conciliationism from an objection that has been put forward by Kelly (2010). He argues that Conciliationism is not compatible with Permissivism, and, for this reason, Conciliationism commits one to the Uniqueness Thesis (Uniqueness). Kelly sees this as a significant liability, because, as he argues, Uniqueness amounts to an extremely strong and unobvious view. I show that Kelly’s argument is ambiguous between two different versions of Permissivism: Options Permissivism and Background-Relative Permissivism. When Permissivism in understood in the former way, Kelly, in fact, establishes that Conciliationism implies a version Uniqueness. However, this version of Uniqueness is a moderate and plausible position. The other reading of Permissivism will be compatible with Conciliationism and will not imply Uniqueness. I conclude that Kelly’s argument fails to pose a problem for Conciliationism.
Epistemic Akrasia and Metaepistemology
Abstract: In my talk, I provide a novel, meta-epistemological argument against the permissibility of forming and maintaining akratic beliefs: beliefs that one judges to be irrational or unjustified. I show that epistemically akratic beliefs conflict with a plausible epistemic principle – the Deference Principle: If agent S1 judges that S2's belief that P is rational and that S1 does not have relevant evidence that S2 lacks, then S1 defers to S2's belief that P. I conclude that there are overwhelming reasons to think that holding and maintaining akratic beliefs are epistemically irrational.